It has long been established in military history that every conflict serves as a proving ground for the effectiveness and efficiency of weapon systems. This process is not limited to the belligerents alone; most of the world’s military intelligence agencies closely examine ongoing wars to draw lessons, particularly regarding which weapons succeed on the battlefield and which fall short. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, alongside the limited military confrontations between India and Pakistan in May 2025, provides clear and timely examples of this phenomenon.
Recent developments in these conflicts have highlighted a growing shift in the global arms trade—specifically, the increasing prominence of Asian arms markets at the expense of traditional Western suppliers, which have dominated this sector for decades. This article argues that the pivot toward Asian defence suppliers is not a passing trend, but rather reflects a broader, lasting realignment that is likely to intensify in the coming years. Several key factors behind this shift will be explored in the following analysis.
The Enduring Western Dominance
According to data published in March 2025 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Western dominance over global arms exports remains intact—and has even strengthened. The United States’ share of global arms exports rose from approximately 35% to 43% during the period 2020–2024, compared to 2015–2019.
However, a closer examination reveals a more nuanced picture. A significant portion of these American exports—around 35%—were destined for European countries, rather than the Middle East, which accounted for about 33%. Notably, NATO member states in Europe doubled their purchases of American weapons during this period, representing a 105% increase over the previous five-year cycle.
This surge in demand was driven largely by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which prompted the U.S. and 34 other nations to ramp up arms transfers to Ukraine starting in 2022. In total, Washington has provided at least $123 billion in aid to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion, with military assistance accounting for $69 billion—or 56%—of this total, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, a German think tank that tracks such data.
While SIPRI’s data is comprehensive, it is not exhaustive. The institute compiles its figures from open sources, meaning that undisclosed arms deals—especially those involving sensitive transfers—are absent from the database. Many nations prefer to keep such transactions secret to avoid geopolitical repercussions, particularly from the United States, which has aggressively enforced its Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) to dissuade countries from purchasing Russian weapons. Under CAATSA, Washington has imposed sanctions on states and entities that engage in significant transactions with Russia’s defence sector, as seen in 2018 when China’s military was sanctioned for buying 10 Su-35 fighter jets from Russia’s Sukhoi Corporation.
Russia’s Resilient Arms Industry
Despite Western pressure, Russian arms exports remain substantial. According to Alexander Mikheev, Director General of Rosoboronexport, Russia’s defence industrial complex increased production to meet both domestic and foreign demand in 2024. Russian military exports that year reached $57 billion, maintaining the country’s position as the world’s second-largest arms exporter and the leading arms producer.
Mikheev also announced in February 2025 that new arms contracts worth more than $4.5 billion were signed with 15 friendly nations at the start of the year. One notable example came from Saudi Arabia, which reportedly acquired the Russian “Pantsir-S” air defence system in late 2024—information that surfaced in early 2025 through leaked emails from RosElectronics, a subsidiary of Russia’s state-owned defence giant Rostec.
China’s Expanding Defence Footprint
China has also emerged as a formidable player in the global arms market. Between 2020 and 2024, China ranked as the world’s fourth-largest arms exporter, accounting for 5.9% of total global sales, according to SIPRI. Today, five of the world’s twelve largest defence firms are Chinese—a remarkable rise considering that no Chinese company was among the global defence elite just a decade ago.
These firms now manufacture a wide array of defence technologies, from diesel engines and advanced electronics to submarines and unmanned systems, including both aerial and underwater drones.
As with Russia, SIPRI’s data likely underestimates China’s true arms exports. For example, Egypt revealed in April 2025 that it had acquired the Chinese “HQ-9B” air defence system amid rising tensions with Israel over its conflict in Gaza—a transaction not recorded in SIPRI’s database. This omission suggests that Beijing, like Moscow, often opts for discreet arms deals, meaning China’s actual export figures may be significantly higher than publicly reported.
Looking Ahead: Implications for Arab Defence Procurement
The growing appeal of Asian arms suppliers raises important questions for Arab nations seeking to diversify their sources of military hardware. In the coming sections, this analysis will delve into the strategic, economic, and geopolitical factors that may drive Arab states to consider non-Western suppliers more seriously in their future procurement decisions.
The Declining Effectiveness of Western Weaponry
Wars and armed conflicts serve as a real test not only of the combat effectiveness and military doctrines of the warring sides but also of the performance of their respective weapon systems. While it is true that the effectiveness of weapons is closely linked to the level of training among the forces using them, this factor applies universally to all militaries and can therefore be largely set aside in such analyses. After all, nations—especially those engaged in rivalries—typically maintain high levels of readiness and training in anticipation of potential conflicts.
The ongoing Russia–Ukraine war provides a clear example in this regard. Western nations heavily promoted their advanced weaponry, claiming that these systems would not only defeat the Russian military on various battlefronts but could potentially alter the course of the war itself. However, these Western systems, hailed as game-changers capable of securing victory for Ukraine, ultimately fell short of expectations in ways few had anticipated.
There are numerous examples of such underperforming systems. These include the “Switchblade” drone, the M1 Abrams main battle tank, Patriot air defence missiles, the M777 howitzer, the 155mm guided artillery shell, the HIMARS precision rocket system, GPS-guided bombs, and the AI-powered Skydio drones. All these weapons were deployed to the battlefield but failed to deliver the anticipated results. The Switchblade drone, for instance, with a unit cost of $60,000 and limited production due to its high price, proved ineffective against armoured targets. Ukrainian forces quickly abandoned their use in favour of commercial Chinese drones priced at just $700 and ordered online.
The $10 million M1 Abrams tank not only turned out to be an easy target for Russian drones but also suffered from repeated technical failures. The tanks were swiftly withdrawn from combat operations, but not before Russian forces destroyed several units and captured at least one. This captured tank was transported to Moscow and displayed alongside other NATO equipment—including an M777 howitzer—at an exhibition in Moscow’s military park.
In contrast, Western countries themselves have acknowledged the superiority of certain Russian weapon systems. Nowhere is this more evident than in Russia’s successful neutralisation of NATO’s most advanced precision-guided munitions in Ukraine. According to a senior European military expert, the effectiveness of such munitions plummeted from 95% to merely 6%, largely due to Russia’s dominance in electronic warfare. This technological advantage eventually forced Ukraine to suspend their use.
The former Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, confirmed this reality. He admitted that some Western-supplied munitions initially gave Kyiv a significant battlefield edge against Russian forces—but only for a limited period. Zaluzhnyi specifically cited the “Excalibur” shell as an example. Its targeting system relies on GPS signals, which were rendered unreliable by Russian electronic jamming, thus severely degrading its effectiveness. Ukrainian military officials and analysts also reported similar issues with Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) and HIMARS-launched guided rockets—both systems equally dependent on GPS guidance.
The shortcomings were not limited to precision-guided munitions alone. Fourth-generation fighter jets, such as the American F-16, also fell short of expectations. The Ukrainian Air Force admitted that Russian fighters and air defence systems outclassed the F-16s. On 3 June 2025, Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson Yurii Ihnat stated: “Unfortunately, Russia currently possesses aircraft with superior detection capabilities and missiles with greater range—even compared to the F-16. They also maintain robust air defences that operate seamlessly with their fighter jets.” This statement came less than a month after Ukraine lost its third F-16 in combat. The aircraft was destroyed on 16 May during a defensive mission aimed at intercepting Russian drones or cruise missiles. Notably, an earlier loss on 12 April occurred deep within Ukrainian-controlled airspace. These losses underscore Kyiv’s reluctance to employ its American fighters in offensive operations, knowing they are highly vulnerable to Russian air defences.
Elsewhere, the India–Pakistan confrontation from 7 to 10 May 2025 unexpectedly tested the capabilities of European and Chinese weapons systems against each other. During this encounter, Pakistan’s Chinese-made, advanced fourth-generation J-10 aircraft successfully shot down three French-made Indian Rafale fighters. This outcome served as powerful publicity for Chinese weaponry for several reasons. First, nothing promotes a fighter jet more effectively than success in actual combat. Second, India had only recently acquired its Rafale fleet in 2019, meaning the jets were relatively new. Third, both the Rafale and the J-10 belong to the same generation—the advanced fourth generation—making the engagement a fair contest that ultimately demonstrated the superiority of the Chinese platform over its French counterpart.
What makes this encounter a particularly telling assessment of the Rafale’s true combat potential is that, prior to this skirmish, the French aircraft had only been used in asymmetric warfare missions, such as ground strikes in Afghanistan and Libya. As a result, the recent engagement has raised doubts regarding the effectiveness of the Rafale’s defensive systems—especially the Spectra electronic warfare suite, which is designed to protect the aircraft from missile threats and is considered one of its key selling points. The outcome of the battle has cast serious doubt on this system’s real-world effectiveness.
These developments have not only affected India’s and Pakistan’s future procurement plans but have also impacted international arms markets. Indonesia’s Deputy Defence Minister, Doni Ermawan Taufanto, confirmed that Jakarta is now seriously considering the purchase of the Chinese J-10C. Speaking to Indonesia’s national news agency Antara, he remarked: “If the aircraft performs well, based on our evaluations, and meets the standards we’ve set—especially considering its reasonable price—why shouldn’t we take it into consideration?”
China’s Technological Superiority
The long-standing perception of the Chinese armed forces as a military power focused on quantity over quality no longer reflects reality, according to “The Economist”. In recent years, China has significantly improved the effectiveness of its weapons systems to the extent that, in certain areas, it has either matched or even surpassed the United States.
A report published by the magazine cited assessments and analyses from former U.S. military and intelligence officials. Retired U.S. Navy officer Tom Shugart noted that the United States currently lacks anything comparable to the hybrid propulsion systems found in China’s “Type Zhou” submarines. He also pointed to a Chinese amphibious assault ship under construction, the “Type 076”, which is expected to become the largest of its kind in the world and the only vessel equipped to launch unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
As for China’s air force capabilities, Brendan Mulvaney of the China Aerospace Studies Institute—a research centre affiliated with the U.S. Air Force—stated that China now produces high-quality jet engines comparable to those of NATO countries. Additionally, China is manufacturing stealth fighters at a faster pace than the United States. The quality of the weapons carried by these platforms has also improved significantly, including enhanced electronic countermeasure capabilities in air-to-air and anti-ship missiles, according to John Culver, a former CIA official.
In addition to these U.S. assessments, China has developed advanced systems that Western countries have lagged behind in producing, such as the sixth-generation stealth fighters “J-36” and “J-50”. These aircraft were revealed on December 26, 2024, following successful test flights. They combine stealth capabilities with heavy payload capacity, enabling both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions at long ranges and supersonic speeds—posing a significant challenge to modern air defence systems.
This progress comes as the United States reduces its investment in next-generation air superiority fighters, according to its latest defence budget. In response, Washington awarded Boeing a contract in March 2025 to develop the sixth-generation “F-47” fighter jet.
Similarly, China ranks among the world’s leading nations in hypersonic missile development, while the United States, despite spending approximately $12 billion on such weapons by March 2024, had yet to produce an operational system of this kind. This was confirmed by Jeffrey McCormick, the chief intelligence analyst at the U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Centre, in testimony before the U.S. Congress.
The Absence of Political Restrictions
One of the pillars of U.S. policy in the Middle East has been maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME) over regional states. Successive American administrations have reaffirmed their commitment to this principle. In September 2020, then-Defence Secretary Mark Esper pledged support for preserving Israel’s military superiority during a meeting with Israeli Defence Minister Benny Gantz, describing this commitment as the “cornerstone” of U.S.-Israel defence relations. Similarly, in July 2022, former President Joe Biden reiterated Washington’s “ironclad commitment to Israel’s military edge.”
During former President Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia in May 2025, Riyadh announced plans to purchase $142 billion worth of weapons.
In contrast, other global powers such as Russia and China—both producers of fifth-generation fighters—have offered their aircraft to Arab states. Unconfirmed reports suggest that Egypt has shown interest in acquiring China’s “J-35” fifth-generation fighter jet, especially after the recent India-Pakistan military confrontation, which boosted confidence in the performance of Chinese combat aircraft.
The United Arab Emirates, for its part, signed a contract in early 2022 to purchase “L-15A” light trainer jets from China, with deliveries beginning in the fourth quarter of 2023. Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have also procured Chinese-made drones. This reflects a broader trend of increasing defence procurement options for Arab states, particularly as neither China nor Russia imposes restrictions on supplying advanced systems to the Middle East—unlike the U.S.
South Korea has also emerged as an important supplier for several Arab countries, particularly Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, thanks to Seoul’s lack of export restrictions. In February 2022, South Korea’s Hanwha Defence signed a $1.55 billion contract to deliver around 200 “K9 Thunder” self-propelled howitzers to Egypt. That same year, LIG Nex1 secured deals worth $3.32 billion to provide the UAE with a ground-based air defence missile system. Meanwhile, Hanwha, Poongsan, and LIG Nex1 concluded agreements with Saudi Arabia valued at roughly $989 million for multiple rocket launchers, munitions, and electro-optical systems.
Furthermore, HD Hyundai Heavy Industries signed an agreement with Saudi Arabia’s International Maritime Industries to jointly bid on a $2.5 billion government program to acquire five frigates. Egypt is also reportedly in talks with South Korean defence firms Hanwha and KAI regarding potential purchases of the “FA-50” fighter and its “T-50” advanced trainer version.
Conclusion
The trends outlined above indicate a likely shift by regional states toward expanding their procurement of non-Western weapons systems, especially from China and South Korea. This is driven by two main factors: first, the technical and military sophistication of these countries’ defence industries, which in some cases now match or surpass their Western counterparts—as evidenced by the recent India-Pakistan conflict that underscored the effectiveness of Chinese platforms; and second, the absence of political restrictions from Beijing and Seoul regarding arms sales to the Middle East, in stark contrast to the constraints frequently imposed by the United States.●
By: Dr. Shadi Abdelwahab (Associate Professor, National Defence College)
