In May 2025, former U.S. President Donald Trump unveiled a bold new defence initiative known as the “Golden Dome” – an ambitious space-based missile defence project designed to turn outer space into the United States’ first line of defence against sophisticated missile threats. This proposal envisions a network of satellites, interceptors, and smart command centres operating in synergy to create a protective “space shield” capable of neutralising ballistic and hypersonic missile attacks before they reach U.S. soil.
While futuristic in scope, the project revives echoes of an earlier era – most notably the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) launched under President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, which became widely known as “Star Wars.” The announcement raises critical questions about the feasibility of the new system and its implications for global strategic stability, particularly amid intensifying competition with Russia and China.
Reassessing Nuclear Deterrence
To understand the strategic motivations behind the Golden Dome, it is necessary to revisit the fundamental principles of nuclear deterrence. Central to this doctrine is the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), which posits that any nuclear attack by one state would trigger a devastating retaliatory strike by the other – rendering the initial assault effectively suicidal.
Within this framework, two key types of nuclear deterrence capabilities are recognised: countervalue and counterforce. The former targets an adversary’s civilian population and economic infrastructure, forming the historical backbone of MAD. The latter, however, focuses on disarming the opponent by targeting its military nuclear assets, including launch platforms and storage facilities.
Counterforce operations have long been considered impractical due to the vast size and geographic dispersion of nuclear arsenals. Yet, advances in military technology – including space-based reconnaissance, artificial intelligence, and submarine detection - are gradually shifting this balance. Emerging air and missile defence systems now integrate drones, sophisticated sensors, and AI-enabled data analysis to identify and potentially neutralise mobile and stationary nuclear platforms.
Within this evolving technological context, the Golden Dome represents an effort to restore U.S. nuclear dominance by denying adversaries the ability to execute successful missile attacks. In doing so, it mirrors the strategic logic behind previous missile defence initiatives, notably Reagan’s SDI and President George W. Bush’s Ground-based Midcourse Defence (GMD) system.
A History of Ambition and Setbacks
The idea of protecting the United States from nuclear-armed missiles is not new. During the 1950s and 1960s, both the United States and the Soviet Union experimented with “defensive” nuclear-tipped missiles designed to intercept and destroy incoming warheads. These efforts, however, ultimately failed and were abandoned.
One of the most ambitious and well-known American attempts came during the 1980s, with President Ronald Reagan’s “Strategic Defence Initiative” (SDI), which the media dubbed “Star Wars.” The Reagan administration sought to abandon the Cold War-era doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which had deterred nuclear conflict through the threat of total retaliatory annihilation. Instead, SDI aimed to establish U.S. nuclear supremacy by enabling a nuclear first strike-obliterating enemy forces while surviving with “acceptable” losses, estimated in the range of a few million American casualties limited to specific regions rather than national devastation.
To achieve this, the Reagan administration proposed the development of an advanced artificial intelligence system under what was called the “Strategic Computing Program.” This program would manage a space-based missile shield capable of intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) using lasers, missiles, and kinetic projectiles. The idea hinged on dramatically increasing the accuracy of U.S. ICBMs to within a meter, enabling a “decapitation” strike on Soviet capabilities while intercepting retaliatory launches.
However, many programmers and defence computing specialists dismissed the vision as technically unfeasible. Experts noted that “all attempts to model reality through software are, by their nature, reductive,” making comprehensive modelling impossible. David Lorge Parnas, one of the most experienced figures in military software development at the time, argued that software systems must cope with countless unique scenarios, making full testing impossible. Moreover, adversaries constantly adjust tactics in unpredictable ways, adding layers of complexity and uncertainty that software systems simply cannot handle.
Ultimately, the “Star Wars” initiative collapsed under the weight of these technical limitations. Even the most advanced programs of the time failed to construct reliable models of real-world behaviour. The unpredictability of human decision-making and the vastness of potential scenarios meant the initiative was doomed from the start. Despite the confidence often displayed by policymakers and scientists, the initiative served as a reminder that claims of understanding the real world often far exceed actual knowledge.
The next significant U.S. attempt came under President George W. Bush in 2002 with the introduction of the Ground-based Midcourse Defence (GMD) system. This initiative aimed to detect the launch of an enemy ICBM and destroy its nuclear warhead in mid-flight before it reached U.S. territory.
Detection relies on early-warning satellites that monitor the bright plume of a missile launch and on ground-based radars positioned near adversary territories. These systems can detect a launch within roughly one minute or less and provide preliminary trajectory data within seconds.
Once the missile enters space, radar data is transferred to ground-based tracking stations capable of producing highly accurate targeting information. Based on this data, interceptor missiles are launched to strike the warhead. The number of interceptors deployed depends on factors such as confidence in target identification, the potential for decoys or multiple warheads, and whether there is time for a second interception attempt.
The program came at a high cost-estimated at $63 billion by 2024. Yet its effectiveness remains contested. Intercept tests showed a success rate of only 57%, even under controlled conditions. This means several ICBMs could likely penetrate U.S. defences in the event of an actual attack.
A 2017 U.S. government report acknowledged the system had only limited capability to defend against small numbers of simple missile threats, such as those from North Korea or Iran. Even when a later review stated that the system had “proven capability,” it still emphasised that this applied only to a few long-range threats using simple countermeasures. The report implied that the system would perform far worse against advanced adversaries like Russia or China.
Independent researchers at the Union of Concerned Scientists argued in 2017 that the only successful test against an ICBM-class target had been artificially simplified, boosting the likelihood of success rather than simulating realistic combat conditions.
Even when viewed as part of a broader U.S. missile defence ecosystem-including the THAAD and Aegis systems-the combined success rate stands at 78.8%. This raises serious doubts about whether such a layered defence could withstand even a limited ICBM barrage from a state like North Korea. Against a nuclear peer like Russia or China-with vast arsenals and sophisticated delivery systems-such defences would likely prove inadequate.
Renewing the Quest for Nuclear Dominance
President Trump reaffirmed that the Golden Dome initiative will realise the long-standing vision of Ronald Reagan’s “Star Wars” programme from the 1980s, which aimed to shield the United States from incoming nuclear missiles. “We are truly completing the mission that President Reagan started 40 years ago,” Trump declared, “ending the missile threat to the American homeland forever.”
The Golden Dome relies on cutting-edge components, including thousands of low-Earth orbit micro-satellites equipped with ultra-sensitive sensors capable of tracking objects travelling at over Mach 20 (1 Mach = 1,234 km/h). These satellites will be supported by both mobile and fixed orbital launch platforms capable of deploying interceptor missiles utilising laser and microwave technology, in addition to conventional kinetic interceptors targeting threats from the upper atmosphere to near-space altitudes. The entire system will be governed by advanced artificial intelligence networks, capable of processing massive battlefield data in real time and issuing instantaneous threat-response decisions-faster than any previous defence system.
The system is expected to integrate with current platforms like Aegis, THAAD, and Patriot, forming a layered and interconnected missile shield.
The name “Golden Dome” appears to draw direct inspiration from Israel’s U.S.-funded Iron Dome system-a connection Trump alluded to by noting: “We helped Israel build its system, which has been very successful. But now we have technology far beyond that… hypersonic, ballistic, and advanced cruise missiles will all be cleared from the skies.”
However, two major concerns emerge regarding Trump’s claims. First is the actual interception capability of such systems. While Iron Dome is claimed by its manufacturer, Rafael, to achieve a 90% interception success rate, it is designed primarily for short-range rockets and 155mm artillery shells. In real-world conditions, however, the system has faced significant challenges-particularly under saturation attacks involving the simultaneous launch of a large number of missiles from multiple directions, overwhelming its response capacity. During the Iran-Israel confrontation in June 2025, a senior Israeli intelligence official admitted that the Iron Dome’s effectiveness had dropped to just 65%, without elaborating further on the reasons.
This suggests that no existing air defence system has yet demonstrated a reliable ability to intercept all forms of missile threats.
Second, and perhaps more crucially, both Iron Dome and the proposed Golden Dome share a foundational reliance on artificial intelligence. Iron Dome’s architecture consists of a radar unit and a control centre capable of identifying incoming projectiles and calculating their expected trajectory and impact point. Interceptors are only launched if the system predicts the missile will strike populated areas. If a missile is expected to fall into the sea or uninhabited zones, it is ignored.
This has two implications. First, based on the Israeli experience, it is questionable whether the Golden Dome will be able to intercept missiles launched from other continents-or from space itself-as Trump claims. While U.S. defence technology undoubtedly surpasses Israel’s, the Iron Dome has never faced threats as complex as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or hypersonic weapons of the type possessed by Russia and China.
Second, Israel’s small geographical size makes it feasible to cover with radar and interceptor systems, both stationary and mobile. In contrast, the sheer geographical scale of the United States makes nationwide coverage significantly more difficult to achieve.
Additional challenges are noted by experts. According to the American Physical Society, a single space-based interceptor is unlikely to be in the right place at the right time to intercept a rapidly launched ICBM. To provide meaningful coverage, a vast number of interceptors would be needed. A May 2025 study by the Society estimated that a constellation of approximately 16,000 space-based interceptors would be required to counter a fast salvo of just ten solid-fuel ICBMs-such as North Korea’s Hwasong-18. Unsurprisingly, the financial cost of such a system would be staggering, and it is unclear whether Washington is prepared to shoulder this burden.
Trump also pledged to complete the project within three years-by the end of his current presidential term. However, this timeline appears overly ambitious. The original Strategic Defence Initiative took years to develop and consumed tens of billions of dollars before ultimately being cancelled due to overwhelming technical and financial hurdles. Similarly, the U.S. Missile Defence Shield cost an estimated $63 billion between 2004 and 2024. It is therefore unlikely that the Golden Dome could be realised within such a short timeframe.
Compounding these concerns is the fact that the U.S. remains in the early stages of developing its hypersonic missile systems. If current plans remain on track, the first U.S. hypersonic weapons may be completed by the end of 2025-around seven years after Russia fielded similar systems. To match this capability, Washington must also invest in parallel efforts to build new defensive systems specifically designed to counter hypersonic threats. This task has been likened by experts to “intercepting a bullet with another bullet”-a technological challenge of the highest order.
The Offence–Defence Dilemma
Although the United States promotes the Golden Dome as a defensive initiative aimed at securing the homeland, at its core, the project is no different from President Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative or President George W. Bush’s Ground-based Midcourse Defence (GMD) system. These initiatives sought to detect and intercept ballistic or hypersonic missile threats from adversarial states before they could reach U.S. territory. In doing so, they effectively undermined one of the cornerstones of nuclear deterrence, as previously noted. The true aim of the Golden Dome, ultimately, is to deny America’s rivals-especially Russia and China-the capability to deliver a credible counter strike in the event of a U.S. nuclear first strike.
This perspective was echoed by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova in May 2025, who stated that the Golden Dome project “directly undermines strategic stability.” She added:
“As part of the Golden Dome’s construction, efforts are underway to develop new systems capable of launching preemptive strikes against enemy missiles and the infrastructure supporting them. This reflects a dangerous shift in U.S. military doctrine, which increasingly relies on preemptive attacks. Such an approach is reckless and poses a direct threat to the foundations of strategic stability.”
China’s position was no less critical. On 21 May 2025, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning expressed “deep concern” over the U.S. Golden Dome initiative, warning that it carried “offensive implications” and would heighten the risk of space militarisation and arms races. Beijing characterised the project as a reflection of America’s pursuit of “absolute security,” a doctrine that undermines the principle of indivisible security and disrupts the global strategic balance. China called on the U.S. to abandon the initiative promptly and to take measures that build confidence among major powers.
Regardless of doubts surrounding the effectiveness of the Golden Dome, or whether the U.S. can actually implement it within the three-year timeline proposed by President Trump, one outcome appears certain: rival powers-particularly Russia and China-will respond by developing new military capabilities specifically designed to counter this American initiative.
There are historical precedents for such escalations. On 13 June 2002, during President Bush’s tenure, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and proceeded with the development of its ground-based missile defence system. The ABM Treaty was originally intended to curb arms races and was based on the assumption that if one superpower built a strategic missile defence, the other would respond by expanding its offensive nuclear arsenal to overcome it. This would result in a perpetual arms race-offensive and defensive alike-as each side sought to offset the other’s actions.
This exact scenario unfolded following the U.S. withdrawal from the treaty. Moscow began intensifying efforts to develop hypersonic missile systems as a means to penetrate American defences and restore strategic deterrence. While Russian research into hypersonic technologies dates back to the 1980s, it was Washington’s 2002 treaty withdrawal that accelerated those efforts significantly. In fact, both Russia and China have outpaced the U.S. in this domain, with Russia becoming the first nation to operationally deploy hypersonic missiles.
For its part, Washington defends the Golden Dome because both Russia and China are expanding their military capabilities in outer space. In February 2024, the U.S. accused Russia of developing a nuclear-powered anti-satellite weapon, sparking speculation about whether it was an electronic warfare satellite powered by a nuclear reactor or a space-based nuclear detonation device. Washington also accused China of developing a “fractional orbital bombardment system” and deploying a reusable spaceplane. Additionally, the U.S. Defence Intelligence Agency warned in May 2025 that China could field dozens of nuclear-armed orbital missiles within the next decade.
Regardless of the accuracy of these U.S. claims, it is clear that a new phase of the arms race is underway among the world’s major powers-Russia, China, and the United States.
It is also possible that Washington’s Golden Dome announcement is partly a bargaining tactic designed to strengthen the U.S. negotiating position in future arms control talks with Russia and China. However, such negotiations appear unlikely in the near term, given the intensifying global tensions between these powers-whether over the war in Ukraine or the Taiwan issue.
In conclusion, the Golden Dome project raises fundamental questions about its true effectiveness-particularly as Trump has explicitly framed it as a revival of the Strategic Defence Initiative, a programme that ultimately failed to deliver on its promises. This invites the question: Will Trump’s Golden Dome meet the same fate, or succeed where Reagan’s project faltered? A related concern is whether today’s military technology has matured sufficiently to make the Golden Dome a reality-or whether further years of development are still required before such ambitions can be realised.●
By: Dr Shadi Abdulwahab Mansour
(Associate Professor at the National Defence College)
