The release of the United States National Security Strategy by President Donald Trump’s administration in December 2025 triggered a wave of criticism from a wide range of American analysts, alongside official European objections. Critics argued that the document marks a clear break with previous US policy and represents a departure from the rules-based international order established and upheld by successive administrations through to former President Joe Biden. Instead, they contended, the strategy signals a shift towards a transactional, “deal-based” approach to international relations.
Yet a closer reading of the strategy reveals a more nuanced reality. Rather than being an abrupt deviation, the document reflects a powerful and long-standing current within US strategic thinking. It signals a transition away from the principles of “liberal hegemony” towards the logic of realist theory, openly acknowledging the rise of major powers and the emergence of a multipolar international system. In this context, the strategy presents “balance of power” policies as the most effective means for preserving US interests in an increasingly competitive global environment.
A New Strategic Framework
On 5 December 2025, the Trump administration unveiled its new National Security Strategy, redefining US priorities on the global stage and recalibrating Washington’s approach to different regions of the world. Inevitably, these changes are set to have direct implications for regional security arrangements and the future of US military engagement abroad.
The strategy rests on several core principles, most notably burden-sharing with allies, the rejection of global dominance as a guiding objective, and a renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere. This latter emphasis represents a modernised revival of the Monroe Doctrine, underscoring the administration’s intent to concentrate American military power closer to home while limiting overseas commitments.
Understanding the full implications of this strategy requires examining the broader context in which it emerged, the governing principles of US military engagement worldwide, its approach to relations with other major powers—particularly China and Russia—and its projected impact on stability across key regions. Before addressing these issues, however, it is essential to revisit the concept and enduring importance of grand strategy in the policies of great powers.
Grand Strategy in Historical Perspective
Historically, strategy was viewed primarily as the science of winning wars. However, as Edward Mead Earle observed during the Second World War, strategy has always been central to the art of statecraft, in both war and peace. Throughout history, states have formulated and implemented strategies to compete with rivals outside the battlefield, as seen in the rivalries between Athens and Sparta, France and Britain, Britain and Germany, and later between the United States and the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan, and ultimately the United States and the Soviet Union.
While some rivalries, such as the Anglo-American competition, concluded peacefully, others—most notably the Anglo-German rivalry—culminated in direct conflict. The US–Soviet rivalry, by contrast, produced a prolonged Cold War characterised by proxy conflicts and a tense but enduring “cold peace”.
Grand strategy is commonly defined as the coordination of a state’s instruments of power to achieve political objectives. Military strategy, in turn, employs armed force in service of this broader grand strategy. The effectiveness of any strategy depends on several factors: the clarity of political objectives, an accurate assessment of relative advantages vis-à-vis adversaries, a careful calculation of costs and returns, and a rigorous evaluation of risks and alternative courses of action.
Defining Objectives and Abandoning Overreach
The new US National Security Strategy opens by posing a set of fundamental questions: What does the United States seek to achieve? What tools are available to achieve these goals? And how can ends and means be effectively aligned within a coherent national security framework? The framing of these questions suggests a deliberate move towards narrowly defined, concrete objectives rather than expansive ambitions.
Accordingly, the strategy defines US foreign policy primarily as the protection of “core national interests”, signalling an implicit retreat from broader goals such as the promotion of democratic values or the maintenance of American global hegemony. President Trump underscores this approach by declaring that the strategy serves as a “roadmap to ensure that America remains the greatest and most successful nation in the history of mankind”. He further emphasises that the United States will continue to strengthen all aspects of its national power to become “safer, richer, freer, greater, and stronger than ever before”.
While the preservation of US primacy remains the overarching objective, the means of achieving it mark a clear departure from previous approaches. Rather than pursuing dominance over the international system, the strategy explicitly embraces balance-of-power politics—a notable break from the framework adopted under the Biden administration.
Instruments of Power and Strategic Priorities
To achieve its stated objectives, the strategy calls for the reinforcement of all instruments of American power, with particular emphasis on military strength. Military power is presented as essential for deterring adversaries and preventing conflicts, such as a potential war over Taiwan, that could undermine US strategic priorities. Economic power is likewise highlighted as a tool for maintaining America’s attractiveness as a global partner, especially in competition with China.
Diplomacy also features prominently, with the strategy advocating US-led peace initiatives, including mediation efforts between Russia and Europe to resolve the Russia–Ukraine war. In parallel, the document acknowledges the continued relevance of American soft power and intelligence capabilities. The US intelligence community is tasked with monitoring critical supply chains and technological developments worldwide to ensure early detection of threats to American security and prosperity.
Taken together, these measures reflect a comprehensive effort to integrate all elements of national power towards a single strategic aim: avoiding costly new wars that could distract Washington from its primary challenge—strategic competition with China.
Correcting Faulty Assumptions
In the second major pillar of the new National Security Strategy, the Trump administration argues that previous US policies were built on a set of flawed assumptions that ultimately produced serious strategic miscalculations. The strategy explicitly identifies one such assumption that dominated American thinking for nearly three decades: the belief that opening US markets to China, encouraging American companies to invest there, and relocating US industries to Chinese territory would facilitate Beijing’s integration into the so-called “rules-based international order”.
According to the strategy, this assumption proved fundamentally incorrect. China did not converge with the existing order; instead, it grew wealthier and more powerful and used that accumulated wealth and power to secure substantial strategic gains. The document goes further, asserting that American elites—across four successive administrations from both political parties—were either complicit in enabling China’s rise or in a state of denial about its consequences.
A second assumption, though not explicitly stated in the strategy, is closely associated with the previous administration. It is the belief that Russia could be defeated in a rapid war through NATO’s diplomatic, military, and economic support for Ukraine. President Trump has repeatedly criticised this notion in his public statements, insisting that the conflict is “Biden’s war”, that it would not have occurred had he been president, and that it is not a war the West can decisively win.
This implicit reassessment has led Washington to adopt a markedly different posture towards Moscow. Russia is no longer treated as an outright threat but rather as a party to a conflict in which the United States positions itself as a mediator between Moscow and Europe. The strategy states that Washington will engage in extensive diplomacy to establish conditions for strategic stability across the Eurasian landmass and to reduce the risk of direct conflict between Russia and European states. While acknowledging that many European countries view Russia as an existential threat, the document makes clear that the Trump administration does not fully share this assessment.
New Strategic Assumptions
In contrast to the assumptions it seeks to discard, the strategy advances a new set of premises to guide US policy. Foremost among these is the conviction that the Indo-Pacific will remain one of the principal arenas of economic and geopolitical competition throughout the coming century. The region already accounts for nearly half of global GDP when measured by purchasing power parity and approximately one-third in nominal terms, a share that is expected to grow steadily over the twenty-first century.
From this perspective, the strategy argues that US prosperity depends on its ability to compete effectively in the Indo-Pacific. Washington, it asserts, possesses the necessary economic, military, technological, and soft power capabilities—alongside the historical support of allies and partners—to prevail in this competition. While China is clearly identified as the United States’ primary competitor in the region, the strategy notably avoids naming it explicitly, reflecting a deliberate effort to moderate rhetorical escalation.
A second assumption underpinning the strategy concerns long-term economic growth. It posits that if the United States maintains a trajectory of sustained growth while preserving a genuinely mutually beneficial economic relationship with Beijing, the US economy—valued at approximately $30 trillion in 2025—could expand to $40 trillion by the 2040s. Such growth, the strategy contends, would secure America’s position as the world’s largest economy.
SAN DIEGO – OCT 5: Marines demonstrating during the 2008 MCAS Miramar Air Show.
Protecting US Interests
The third pillar of the strategy centres on a more restrictive and clearly defined understanding of American interests. By comparison, the 2022 National Security Strategy issued under the Biden administration identified broad objectives such as protecting the American people, expanding economic opportunity, and defending democratic values. Achieving these goals was linked to strengthening the economy and alliances and prevailing in strategic competition with Russia and China.
President Trump appears to regard several of these objectives as overly general or unrealistic, particularly the defence of democratic values abroad or the pursuit of outright victory over Russia. Accordingly, his strategy narrows the focus to what it defines as core US interests. Chief among these is the stability of the Western Hemisphere, aimed at preventing mass migration into the United States and blocking hostile foreign presence in the region.
The strategy also identifies as a vital interest the prevention of economic harm inflicted by foreign actors, implicitly referring to both allies and competitors—most notably China—who are seen as gaining unfair advantages in trade with the United States. In addition, the document stresses the importance of guaranteeing freedom of navigation, a veiled reference to safeguarding global maritime chokepoints, whether in the Middle East or Southeast Asia, from control or disruption by foreign powers.
Other stated interests include restoring Europe’s Western identity, preventing domination of the Middle East—particularly over oil and gas supplies—and maintaining US global leadership in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum computing.
Redefining Threats
Notably, the strategy adopts a less confrontational tone in defining threats than previous documents. Russia and China are not labelled as direct threats to US national security. Even in reference to the Middle East, great-power competition is described merely as “manoeuvres”, signalling an intent to lower rhetorical escalation with both Moscow and Beijing.
Nevertheless, the strategy underscores the need to counter specific threats emanating from these powers. It states that the United States will prevent competitors from outside the Western Hemisphere from deploying threatening forces or acquiring control over vital strategic assets. This language implicitly targets Russia’s defence ties with states such as Venezuela and China’s expanding footprint in strategically sensitive areas of Latin America, including the Panama Canal. To that end, the strategy calls for enhanced US military presence in Latin America to address what it describes as “urgent threats”.
At the same time, the document asserts that the internal affairs of other states will only concern Washington insofar as they directly threaten US interests, reinforcing the administration’s emphasis on restraint and selectivity.
In contrast, the strategy identifies the most serious threat to the United States as originating at its own borders. It describes what it terms an “invasion”, encompassing not only uncontrolled migration but also transnational threats such as terrorism, drug trafficking, espionage, and human trafficking. Immigration, in particular, occupies a central place in President Trump’s strategic outlook, as it is portrayed as undermining the Western identity of both the United States and European societies—a theme that the strategy develops further in subsequent sections.
Offshore Balancing as a Strategic Doctrine
The fourth pillar of the new National Security Strategy reflects a clear and deliberate embrace of realist principles. At its core lies an explicit acceptance that the international system has transitioned into a multipolar order and that continued attempts to preserve American hegemony are neither sustainable nor desirable. This marks a significant departure from the approach that governed successive US administrations, beginning with that of George W. Bush.
Under Bush, US foreign and security policy was characterised by unilateral tendencies, active efforts at regime change under the banner of democracy promotion, strong support for NATO’s eastward expansion into the post-Soviet space, and the pursuit of destabilising projects such as missile defence. These initiatives were widely viewed as undermining strategic stability, particularly by eroding the foundations of nuclear deterrence between Washington and Moscow.
The subsequent administrations of Barack Obama and Joe Biden did not fundamentally alter this trajectory. Indeed, the 2022 National Security Strategy issued under President Biden explicitly asserted that “no nation is better positioned to lead the world with power and purpose than the United States of America”. It further acknowledged that the post–Cold War era had ended and that great-power competition was underway, while maintaining that the United States remained uniquely positioned to prevail. Although this language recognised systemic change and the return of major-power rivalry, it nonetheless reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to hegemonic leadership.
A Break with the Logic of Hegemony
By contrast, the Trump administration has explicitly abandoned the ambition of global hegemony, which it views as having overstretched and exhausted American power. A close reading of the new strategy reveals that it avoids direct references to the rise of great-power competition altogether. The term appears only once, in the form of “strategic competition”, and even then without explicitly naming China. Instead, the document stresses the importance of maintaining a favourable balance of power for the United States as a prerequisite for strategic competition, before turning to the issue of Taiwan as a critical case in point.
At the same time, the strategy adopts a more conciliatory tone towards competitors. It frames the challenge not as defeating rivals but as “managing Europe’s relationship with Russia” and “rebalancing America’s economic relationship with China”. It further describes the “outsized influence of larger, wealthier, and more powerful states” as an enduring reality of international relations. This language amounts to an implicit acknowledgement of a multipolar world and a rejection of what the strategy terms the failed concept of “global hegemony”. Instead, the United States positions itself as a supporter of both global and regional balances of power. The underlying implication is that Washington is less preoccupied with constant strategic competition and more open to recognising spheres of influence, provided that no single power achieves dominance over the international system.
Preventing Hegemony through Balance
The strategy’s critique extends to the post–Cold War consensus among American elites, which assumed that sustained US hegemony served Washington’s long-term interests. Trump’s strategy firmly rejects this premise, asserting that the United States does not seek hegemony for itself. However, this restraint does not imply passivity. On the contrary, the strategy makes clear that Washington will work actively—together with allies and partners—to prevent any other power from achieving hegemonic status, whether globally or regionally, by preserving favourable balances of power.
Within this framework, alliances continue to play a central role, but their function differs markedly from that envisioned by previous administrations. Since the Cold War, formal and informal alliances in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East have constituted a cornerstone of US grand strategy. For decades, successive US presidents believed that these alliances were essential for safeguarding American interests by insulating Washington from the instability of the international system and preventing external shocks from reverberating back into domestic politics.
This long-standing view held that the political and military costs of maintaining alliances were modest compared to the potential costs of wars that might follow a US retrenchment. Alliances were thus seen as a dual solution: reassuring partners while deterring adversaries. The Trump administration, however, challenges this assumption.
Rethinking Alliances and Burden-Sharing
From the perspective of the Trump administration, US allies have taken advantage of these arrangements, shifting the bulk of the security burden onto Washington and behaving as “free riders” under the American security umbrella. In some cases, allies are even seen as having drawn the United States into conflicts that do not serve core American interests. As a result, the administration has sought to recalibrate alliance relationships by compelling partners to assume a greater share of responsibility, most notably by increasing defence spending.
This approach closely aligns with the concept of the “offshore balancer”, articulated by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt in 2016 as the optimal grand strategy for the United States. Offshore balancing calls for abandoning ambitious efforts to remake other societies and instead focusing on preserving US primacy in the Western Hemisphere. Beyond that, Washington should rely on regional actors to check potential hegemons in key areas such as Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Arabian Gulf, intervening directly only when local balances fail.
Trump’s new strategy explicitly reflects this logic through its emphasis on two related principles: “burden sharing” and “burden shifting”. The document states unambiguously that “the days of the United States supporting the entire global order are over”. It argues that many US allies and partners are wealthy, advanced states that must bear primary responsibility for their own regions and contribute more meaningfully to collective defence. NATO’s requirement that members spend 5 per cent of their GDP on defence is presented as a concrete expression of this approach, designed to ensure a more equitable distribution of costs.
Domestic Support for Strategic Restraint
Although critics argue that Trump’s strategy lacks a broad consensus within Washington, it in fact reflects a substantial and enduring current in American public opinion. A 2016 Pew Research Center survey found that approximately 57 per cent of Americans believed the United States should focus on addressing its own problems and allow other countries to manage theirs as best they can.
The strategy reinforces this outlook by invoking the Declaration of Independence and the views of the Founding Fathers, whom it portrays as favouring non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. This historical framing is intended to legitimise a more restrained and selective US role in global affairs. Before turning to Washington’s approach towards allies across different regions, however, it is necessary to address the issue of regime change—a persistent and often ambiguous feature of US foreign policy—which remains central to understanding the practical implications of this strategic shift.
Abandoning Regime Change?
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argue that America’s long-standing pursuit of hegemony has produced repeated foreign policy failures. It neither prevented Russia’s annexation of Crimea nor halted China’s expanding influence in its surrounding waters. More consequentially, it contributed to prolonged instability across the Arab world. Much of this turmoil, they contend, can be traced to US-led regime change policies in Iraq and Libya, which generated regional chaos and created the conditions for the emergence of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS). In their assessment, successive Democratic and Republican administrations alike embraced the principles of liberal hegemony and the practice of regime change, with deeply destabilising results.
The new US National Security Strategy appears to align closely with this critique, particularly regarding regime change. This alignment is underscored by statements from the US Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, who declared that Washington’s previous approach of “regime change or nation-building” had come to an end under President Donald Trump. Gabbard argued that for decades, US foreign policy had been trapped in an unproductive and endless cycle of overthrowing governments or attempting to build states, a cycle that ultimately left the United States with “more enemies than allies”. She further noted that these policies had cost trillions of dollars, resulted in the loss of countless lives, and, in many cases, produced even greater security threats.
Against this backdrop, Trump’s strategy emphasises the pursuit of constructive and peaceful commercial relations with countries around the world, without imposing democracy or demanding profound social transformations that run counter to their traditions and historical trajectories. Elsewhere, the document invokes the US Declaration of Independence, highlighting the principle that all nations are entitled to a “separate and equal station” among their peers. Taken together, these references signal an apparent shift towards a policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states—a stance long championed by China and Russia and one that holds particular appeal for many developing countries.
The Limits of Non-Intervention
Despite this explicit rejection of regime change, it would be misleading to conclude that Washington has abandoned the practice entirely. Rather, the strategy appears to redefine its geographical scope. Under the new framework, the United States reserves the right to intervene in, or exert decisive influence over, the Western Hemisphere—reviving the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine in what President Trump has described as a “Trump Corollary” to it—as well as in Europe, which the strategy portrays as a civilisational extension of the United States. Two indicators point clearly in this direction. The first is explicitly stated in the strategy itself. The document warns of a potential “civilisational erasure” of Europe, asserting that within a few decades, at most, some NATO countries are likely to become majority non-European. It therefore calls for measures to help Europe “correct its current trajectory”. This language has been widely interpreted as overt US support for far-right movements across Europe, many of which espouse similar positions, particularly on halting immigration and preserving Europe’s Christian identity.
The importance of this dimension in President Trump’s thinking has been evident in his public remarks, including his rhetorical question to elected officials: “Why don’t we take people from Sweden or Norway?”—a statement widely understood as a rejection of refugees from non-Western countries. Several figures close to Trump share this outlook, most notably Elon Musk, who has expressed open support for the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a right-wing European party. The AfD, in turn, praised the new US National Security Strategy for warning of the decline of European civilisation. In early December 2025, the party announced that around 20 of its parliamentarians would travel to the United States to meet with Republican officials, with the stated aim of “building strong partnerships with forces that defend national sovereignty, cultural identity, and realistic security and migration policies”. Such moves have been widely viewed as clear interference in European affairs. These developments prompted criticism from German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who stated that “parts of the strategy are unacceptable to us from a European perspective”, referring specifically to sections addressing the future of democracy in Europe.
Regime Change in the Western Hemisphere
The second indicator of the revised geographical boundaries of regime change policy can be seen in US behaviour towards Venezuela. In December 2025, American officials reportedly leaked information suggesting that Washington had developed plans for the post-Maduro era. This was accompanied by heightened US military deployments near Venezuela and threats of air strikes, aimed at pressuring President Nicolás Maduro to step down.
Taken together, these actions suggest that while the United States rejects regime change as a universal policy, it continues to view the Western Hemisphere and Europe as exceptional cases. Washington appears to be redividing the world into distinct spheres of influence, each governed by different priorities and thresholds for intervention—a trend that sets the stage for the next phase of analysis on how this strategy is applied across different regions.
Reordering the World’s Regions
The US National Security Strategy issued under former President Joe Biden in 2022 warned that the most significant strategic challenge facing the American vision emanated from powers combining authoritarian governance with revisionist foreign policies—that is, states seeking to alter or reshape the existing international order. The strategy’s response to this challenge was centred on prevailing in strategic competition with China and constraining Russia’s aggressive behaviour. This assessment was largely consistent with the US National Security Strategy released during President Trump’s first term in 2017, which explicitly affirmed the return of great-power rivalry and described China and Russia as “revisionist” powers seeking to undermine American global primacy. Under Trump’s second administration, however, the US position shifted fundamentally. The new strategy asserts that major powers can coexist by limiting interference in one another’s regions—a position that amounts to a de facto acknowledgement of the return of spheres of influence. This shift appears to be a direct consequence of the United States’ failure to defeat Russia in Ukraine. The strategy articulates this view explicitly, directing sharp criticism at European governments and stating that “the Trump administration finds itself at odds with European officials who hold unrealistic expectations regarding the war” in Ukraine—an implicit reference to what Washington views as implausible expectations of Russia’s defeat.
Accordingly, the Trump administration openly adopts a policy advocating the division of the world into spheres of influence, whereby each great power is granted freedom to exercise dominance within its own region. Implicitly, this suggests that the United States may be willing to accept Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territory in exchange for Moscow refraining from interference in Latin America—the United States’ strategic backyard. A close reading of the new strategy, however, reveals that Washington does not extend the same logic to China. The United States remains unwilling to accept Chinese control over Taiwan and continues to prioritise deterring Beijing from launching a military operation aimed at reclaiming the island.
Under the new strategic framework, Washington no longer seeks to focus on every corner of the globe, as was the case in previous strategies. Such an approach, the strategy argues, “caused Washington to lose focus—the very opposite of what a strategy should achieve”. The document justifies this recalibration by stressing that the United States cannot bear the costs of remaining perpetually engaged in all regions and crises worldwide. Consequently, the Western Hemisphere is designated as the top strategic priority. Here, the Trump administration emphasises reviving the Monroe Doctrine, positioning Washington as the primary hegemonic power in the region. This is to be pursued through reliance on established allies to manage migration, stem narcotics flows, and enhance land and maritime security, alongside forging partnerships with new allies by reinforcing the United States’ appeal as the preferred economic and security partner in the hemisphere.
The United States will also seek to persuade Latin American governments to reject cooperation with extra-hemispheric powers, warning that such engagement entails hidden costs—including espionage, cybersecurity threats, and debt traps—an implicit reference to China. In return for curtailing such cooperation, Washington pledges to expand economic and technological collaboration and provide higher-quality goods and services. The principal instrument for achieving these objectives will be economic statecraft, implemented through coordination between the US government and the American private sector.
Asia ranks as the second most important region in the strategy. This prioritisation is justified by the fact that the Indo-Pacific region accounts for nearly half of global GDP in real terms and is therefore expected to remain the primary arena of economic and geopolitical competition throughout the coming century. Once again, the United States presents itself as best positioned to compete successfully in this region, citing its status as the world’s strongest economy and military, its unmatched innovation capacity, unparalleled soft power, and a historical record of benefiting allies and partners. The strategy places particular emphasis on India, highlighting the need to improve bilateral relations and encourage New Delhi to contribute more actively to Indo-Pacific security, including through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) with Australia, Japan, and the United States. Central to cooperation with regional allies, the strategy stresses, is preventing any single strategic competitor—implicitly China—from achieving regional hegemony.
The document further underscores that conventional military balance remains a core component of strategic competition, once again implicitly referencing US–China rivalry. In this context, Taiwan is accorded exceptional importance due to its dominance in semiconductor manufacturing, its strategic location enabling access to the Second Island Chain, its role in separating Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theatres, and the fact that one-third of global shipping passes annually through the South China Sea. These factors have direct implications for the US economy, making deterrence of a conflict over Taiwan a strategic priority. The strategy also asserts that the United States cannot—and should not—shoulder this burden alone. Instead, allies, particularly Japan and South Korea, are expected to increase defence spending and acquire new defensive capabilities to deter adversaries and protect the First Island Chain—an implicit reference to China. Closely related to this challenge, the strategy identifies as a major security threat any attempt by a competitor, again implicitly China, to control the South China Sea, given the severe implications such control would have for US interests.
Finally, while avoiding explicit language, the strategy does not overlook the military dimension of competition with China and Russia. It designates the “Golden Dome” missile shield as a strategic objective—described as next-generation missile defence systems intended to protect the United States, its overseas assets, and its allies. This initiative is clearly aimed at countering Russian and Chinese superiority in hypersonic missile production, against which existing US air defence systems are largely ineffective. US credibility in defending Taiwan has increasingly been called into question, particularly following the leak of a “top secret” Pentagon report in December 2025, which warned that the United States would suffer a “crushing defeat” and lose its largest aircraft carrier if it attempted to prevent a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, given China’s arsenal of approximately 600 hypersonic weapons, alongside nuclear missiles and submarines. As a result, Washington now views the development of a new defensive architecture as essential to breaking Chinese military superiority and restoring deterrence to prevent the forcible annexation of Taiwan.
Below is a refined, publication-ready translation into British English, fully aligned in tone, structure, and analytical register with the previous sections.
Europe as the Third Strategic Priority
Europe ranks third among the priorities of the US National Security Strategy. In this context, the strategy warns of a range of European challenges that extend beyond declining defence spending and economic stagnation, as well as Europe’s shrinking share of global GDP—from approximately 25 per cent in 1990 to just 14 per cent today. More significantly, the strategy highlights what it terms the risk of “civilisational erasure”, which it attributes to European Union institutions that, in Washington’s view, constrain political freedom and national sovereignty while promoting migration policies that threaten national identities. According to the strategy, these dynamics may render Europe unrecognisable within twenty years or less, as some European countries are projected to become majority non-European. Such demographic transformations, the document warns, could ultimately prompt Europeans to reconsider their alliance with the United States.
With regard to relations with Russia, the strategy identifies a core US interest in negotiating an end to the war in Ukraine in order to stabilise the European continent, prevent further escalation, and restore strategic stability with Moscow. Here again, the strategy delivers sharp criticism of Europe, asserting that while the majority of Europeans desire peace, this preference has not been translated into policy due to what it describes as the obstruction of democratic processes by European governments.
Despite these criticisms, Europe remains vital to US interests as one of the pillars of the global economy and a key contributor to American prosperity. Accordingly, the strategy calls for the use of diplomacy to promote what it describes as “genuine democracy” and to revive the national character of individual European states. In this regard, the strategy explicitly identifies nationalist—far-right—political parties as the principal opportunity through which the United States can exert influence and lend support.
The Middle East as a Secondary Theatre
The Middle East ranks fourth in the hierarchy of US strategic priorities. The strategy argues that the region’s relative decline in importance does not stem from a loss of strategic value, but rather from the fact that it is no longer viewed as a primary source of imminent catastrophes, as it was in the past. Historically, the Middle East occupied a top-tier position in US foreign policy for clear reasons: it is the world’s most important energy-producing region, a central arena for great-power competition, and a locus of conflicts capable of spilling over into other regions, including the United States itself. According to the strategy, however, two of these three drivers are no longer operative. First, the United States has become a net exporter of oil. Second, Washington has successfully revitalised its alliances with the Gulf states, other Arab countries, and Israel, thereby securing a strong regional position. As for regional conflicts, the strategy argues that their intensity has diminished following the weakening of Iran after “Operation Midnight Hammer” in June 2025, which significantly undermined Iran’s nuclear programme. As a result, Washington concludes that the historical rationale for prioritising the Middle East has receded. Nevertheless, the region retains considerable importance as both a source and destination of global investment and advanced industries, including nuclear technology and artificial intelligence. The strategy contends that success in the Middle East hinges on accepting the region—its leaders and societies—as they are, and working with them to pursue shared interests. These interests include preventing hostile powers from gaining control over regional energy resources, ensuring that the Strait of Hormuz remains open, safeguarding navigation in the Red Sea, preventing the region from becoming a breeding ground for terrorism, and eliminating threats to Israel’s security.
In this context, Washington supports diplomatic efforts to expand the Abraham Accords to include additional countries. Undoubtedly, the achievement of peace agreements—both in the Middle East and globally—reduces the likelihood of US military entanglement and allows Washington to concentrate on what it views as its most consequential strategic challenge: competition with China.
Conclusion
A review of the US National Security Strategy reveals profound shifts in American strategic thinking. The strategy sets more realistic objectives than its predecessors, abandoning the notion of the United States as the guardian of a “rules-based international order”. Instead, it defines US priorities more narrowly: defending the Western Hemisphere and preserving European culture from what the strategy portrays as the threat posed by migration.
A second defining feature of the strategy is its deliberate avoidance of explicit references to strategic competition between the United States on the one hand and China and Russia on the other. In the case of Russia, the United States appears to have removed Moscow from its list of primary strategic adversaries, instead positioning itself as a potential mediator between Russia and Europe in pursuit of stability in Ukraine.
China, by contrast, remains the central focus of US containment efforts. The strategy repeatedly underscores the importance of constraining China economically and militarily in Southeast Asia to prevent it from becoming the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific region, even as it largely avoids naming China explicitly. It also affirms that preventing China from annexing Taiwan constitutes a core US interest, given the severe disruption such a move would inflict on the balance of power. Washington intends to pursue this objective primarily through alliances and by compelling its partners to assume greater security responsibilities. In this sense, the new US strategy can be seen as a practical application of an offshore balancing approach. As for the Middle East, the region continues to hold central importance due to energy resources, critical maritime chokepoints, and investment opportunities beneficial to the US economy. However, the strategy notably downplays the significance of Russian or Chinese efforts to expand their presence in the region and appears overly optimistic in its assessment of regional stability—particularly given that neither the Iranian nuclear issue nor the Palestinian question has been fully resolved.
Overall, the prevailing US approach is increasingly characterised by an expectation that regional actors assume primary responsibility for security within their own areas, while Washington adopts a less central, more selective role within these alliances.
By: Dr Shadi Abdelwahab
(Associate Professor, National Defence College)
