Cable Wars Are they reshaping the future of naval confrontations‭?‬

Submarine cables and other underwater infrastructure such as oil and gas pipelines are increasingly vulnerable‭. ‬This vulnerability stems from fierce international competition for dominance in this field and a rise in attacks targeting these cables‭. ‬Recent‭ ‬incidents have highlighted how submarine cables have become a critical weakness in the global economy‭. ‬The nature and scale of underwater infrastructure make it challenging to provide adequate protection‭, ‬making them a primary target for grey zone conflicts involving deniable attacks that do not escalate to full-scale wars‭.‬

The ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war and its repercussions in the Baltic Sea‭, ‬the North Sea‭, ‬and the Black Sea‭, ‬as well as the persistent Houthi attacks in the Red Sea‭, ‬raise many questions about the future of underwater warfare and how these conflicts will be conducted‭. ‬Moreover‭, ‬the increasing targeting of maritime infrastructure reflects submarine infrastructure’s significant role‭ ‬in the current global security landscape and its influence on future naval warfare‭.‬

The Evolution of Submarine Cable Importance

Submarine cables are crafted from optical fibres made of silica glass‭, ‬which are incredibly thin and coated with layers of plastic or steel for insulation and protection‭. ‬The installation of these cables in the depths of the sea dates back to the 1850s‭, ‬with the SS Great Eastern laying the first transatlantic cable‭. ‬These cables were primarily used to serve the colonial objectives‭ ‬of major empires‭. ‬To manage the technical complexities associated with these cables‭, ‬the International Telegraph Union‭ (‬ITU‭) ‬was‭ ‬established in 1865‭. ‬Now known as the International Telecommunication Union‭, ‬it took several steps to protect submarine cables‭,‬‭ ‬including the 1884‭ ‬Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables‭. ‬However‭, ‬these cables remained contentious among nations‭, ‬with no consensus on protective measures during wartime‭.‬

In 1982‭, ‬the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea‭ (‬UNCLOS‭) ‬was signed‭, ‬complementing the ITU by safeguarding the freedom of companies to lay submarine cables and pipelines in international waters‭. ‬However‭, ‬the United States has yet to sign this‭ ‬agreement‭, ‬and both the US and China have national laws that conflict with some provisions of UNCLOS‭.‬

Moreover‭, ‬the diverse and multi-faceted network of actors involved in submarine cables adds another layer of complexity to the ITU’s coordination efforts‭. ‬In the absence of a robust regulatory environment ensuring the protection of submarine cables‭, ‬risks‭ ‬associated with the internet and the intensification of conflicts in geostrategic locations‭, ‬such as the South China Sea‭, ‬continue to rise‭.‬

Today‭, ‬submarine cables are crucial globally‭, ‬forming one of the world’s most vital digital infrastructures‭. ‬Over 95%‭ ‬of transcontinental communications rely on these cables‭, ‬which are essential not only for the internet but also for various financial transactions and bank transfers‭. ‬Many defence departments also heavily depend on these submarine cables‭. ‬It is estimated that around‭ $‬10‭ ‬trillion in financial transactions occur annually through over 950,000‭ ‬kilometres of submarine optical cables‭. ‬Any damage to these cables can lead to widespread internet outages and significant economic disruptions‭.‬

Dimensions of Submarine Cable Wars

Cable wars are not a new phenomenon with historical instances including Britain’s targeting of German telegraph cables during World War I‭, ‬and the‭ “‬Ivy Bells‭” ‬operation by the US Navy during the Cold War to tap into Soviet cables‭. ‬However‭, ‬the current international system has made modern cable wars quite different from traditional forms‭. ‬The world is now more interconnected than ever‭, ‬relying heavily on underwater infrastructure for energy‭, ‬natural gas‭, ‬oil‭, ‬and the internet‭. ‬Consequently‭, ‬any attack on this infrastructure in one country can have repercussions for others‭.‬

Traditionally‭, ‬submarine warfare focused on conflicts between submarines‭. ‬However‭, ‬the development of unmanned underwater vehicles and mine countermeasure operations‭, ‬coupled with the growing need to protect underwater infrastructure‭, ‬especially cables‭, ‬has significantly altered the nature of these wars‭.‬

Recent studies have begun to explore the concept of submarine cable warfare‭, ‬highlighting two primary dimensions‭. ‬The first is the intense competition between the United States and China‭, ‬with each side striving for dominance in this field‭. ‬Some estimates‭ ‬suggest that this geopolitical competition could fragment the global internet infrastructure‭, ‬leading to a cold war beneath the‭ ‬waves‭. ‬The second dimension involves the rising threats targeting these cables in recent times‭. ‬These two dimensions can be outlined as follows‭:‬

1‭. ‬A New Undersea Cold War‭: ‬Historically‭, ‬government telecommunications companies were the primary investors in submarine cable infrastructure‭. ‬However‭, ‬this has changed significantly over the past decade‭, ‬with major US tech companies such as Google‭, ‬Microsoft‭, ‬and Meta investing heavily in this sector‭. ‬Between 2016‭ ‬and 2022‭, ‬these investments totalled around‭ $‬2‭ ‬billion‭, ‬accounting for 15%‭ ‬of global investments in submarine cables‭. ‬This figure is expected to increase by an additional‭ $‬3.9‭ ‬billion over the next three years‭, ‬representing 35%‭ ‬of global investments in this sector‭.‬

This shift aligns with the Chinese Communist Party’s belief that achieving dominance involves controlling the information superhighway‭. ‬Submarine internet cables have become the new nerve centre for military and commercial power in the current international system‭. ‬This explains Beijing’s launch of the Digital Silk Road in 2015‭, ‬which included massive investments in submarine cables to establish China’s dominance in the digital realm‭, ‬develop its capabilities‭, ‬and end Western control over this domain‭. ‬This initiative forms a significant aspect of the current submarine cable wars‭.‬

Huawei Marine acquired approximately 15%‭ ‬of the global submarine cable market in 2019‭ ‬before facing stringent US sanctions‭, ‬leading to the acquisition of Huawei Marine by China’s submarine cable company‭, ‬rebranded as HMN Tech which has since been pursuing‭ ‬significant contracts in the submarine cable industry‭.‬

In response to China’s actions‭, ‬the United States has imposed various restrictions on Chinese companies‭, ‬attempting to exclude them from major deals‭. ‬In February 2023‭, ‬the US-based SubCom secured a‭ $‬600‭ ‬million contract for a new submarine cable project after Washington pressured telecom companies not to support the Chinese bid‭. ‬The US Department of Justice’s telecommunications team continues to work diligently to prevent Chinese companies from securing contracts or laying cables directly between the US and‭ ‬China‭.‬

The US launched the‭ “‬Clean Network Initiative‭” ‬in 2020‭ ‬to attract Washington’s allies away from Chinese projects and prevent Chinese companies from becoming key players in the submarine cable market‭. ‬Currently‭, ‬China provides about 10%‭ ‬of the world’s submarine cables‭. ‬In 2021‭, ‬US pressure persuaded the World Bank to cancel a submarine cable project that was supposed to connect three Pacific island nations to avoid awarding the contract to HMN Tech‭. ‬In March 2023‭, ‬the US Congress passed a law to control submarine cables‭, ‬ensuring continued American superiority in this field‭.‬

Meanwhile‭, ‬Western reports in April 2023‭ ‬revealed current Chinese efforts to map one of the world’s most advanced submarine cable networks‭, ‬the EMA project‭, ‬which aims to connect China to Europe via Singapore‭, ‬Pakistan‭, ‬Saudi Arabia‭, ‬Egypt‭, ‬and France‭. ‬This project competes with the American SubCom’s‭ “‬SeaMeWe-6‭” ‬project‭. ‬The construction of two competing submarine cable networks linking Asia and Europe signals a significant trend toward sharp polarization in global internet infrastructure‭, ‬including submarine cables‭, ‬data centres‭, ‬and phone networks‭. ‬This development fosters a less connected international system and pushes toward an‭ ‬underwater Cold War between the Eastern and Western blocs‭.‬

Despite US efforts to impede Chinese advancements in the global submarine cable market‭, ‬Chinese companies have continued to build international cables for Beijing and many of its allied nations in Asia‭, ‬Africa‭, ‬and Latin America‭. ‬Numerous Chinese ships are‭ ‬currently involved in complex repair operations for optical fibres‭, ‬even those owned by the United States‭, ‬complicating Washington’s efforts to exclude Chinese companies from the backbone of the global internet‭.‬

2‭. ‬Increasing Attacks on Submarine Cables‭: ‬Submarine infrastructure has become a part of grey zone conflicts‭. ‬Recent years have seen an marked increase in deliberate and accidental attacks on submarine cables‭. ‬For instance‭, ‬several cables were cut off the coast of southern France in April and October 2022‭, ‬affecting major cables in Asia‭, ‬Europe‭, ‬and the US‭. ‬Natural phenomena also cause damage‭, ‬such as the destruction of submarine cables in Tonga in the South Pacific after a volcanic eruption in January 2022‭.‬

In February 2023‭, ‬Chinese ships cut two submarine cables belonging to Taiwan’s Matsu Islands‭. ‬Although the backup microwave transmission system remained operational‭, ‬communications were extremely slow‭, ‬reflecting the crucial role of submarine cables given‭ ‬the heavy reliance on the internet by advanced economies‭.‬

In February 2024‭, ‬internet connectivity in parts of Asia‭, ‬Africa‭, ‬and Europe suddenly slowed due to damage to three submarine cables in the Red Sea‭. ‬

The Red Sea is a critical chokepoint for internet and communications‭, ‬with around 90%‭ ‬of communications between Europe and Asia‭ ‬passing through it‭, ‬and 17%‭ ‬of global internet traffic passing through submarine cables in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait‭.‬

Although there have been no direct Houthi attacks on submarine cables in the Red Sea‭, ‬some US reports suggest indirect involvement‭, ‬such as the cutting of some submarine cables in February 2024‭ ‬by the anchor of the British ship‭ “‬Rubymar‭” ‬after it was hit by a Houthi missile‭.‬

In addition to submarine communications and internet cables‭, ‬some attacks target other underwater infrastructure‭, ‬such as gas and oil pipelines‭. ‬Notable incidents include the attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines and the Baltic connector pipeline linking Finland and Estonia in 2023‭.‬

Amidst the ongoing Ukrainian war‭, ‬several international reports have warned of the potential danger to submarine cables in the Black Sea‭. ‬Increased maritime activity in the region could lead to the accidental cutting of submarine cables by ships‭, ‬in addition to accusations between international powers of deliberately targeting these cables amidst the current sharp conflicts between‭ ‬Russia and the West‭.‬

Increasing International Interest in Undersea Cable Wars

There is growing international concern about the future of undersea cable wars and their potential outcomes in shaping future underwater conflicts‭. ‬

Despite the Houthis not having carried out actual attacks on submarine cables so far‭, ‬which can be mainly attributed to their relative technological backwardness and lack of submarines capable of reaching the cables‭, ‬we can’t rule out the possibility that the Houthis will develop their maritime tactics to enhance their ability to target underwater infrastructure‭.‬

This possibility is amplified by the fact that the gulf has shallow waters only about 100‭ ‬metres deep‭, ‬thus there is no need for‭ ‬high-tech submarines‭.‬

The attacks on the Nord Stream gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea in September 2022‭ ‬have raised many international concerns about the possibility that the coming years will witness more targeting of the vast underwater infrastructure in Europe‭, ‬which could result in potential modifications and sabotage‭.‬

Russia is particularly invested in enhancing its underwater offensive capabilities and currently possesses a large fleet of nuclear submarines capable of carrying smaller nuclear submarines‭. ‬On the other hand‭, ‬some Western reports have highlighted a major‭ ‬issue regarding the outcomes of the new Cold War between the United States and China‭, ‬which is expected to extend underwater‭. ‬

This will have direct repercussions on future undersea cable wars by dividing the internet into two competing systems‭. ‬The separation of the United States and China in the field of information will have negative implications for global trade‭, ‬online banking‭, ‬and global economic tools‭.‬

Additionally‭, ‬some Western reports suggest that any potential Chinese attack on Taiwan in the future may threaten the underwater‭ ‬infrastructure‭. ‬Given the limited internet cables connecting Taiwan to the outside world‭, ‬including the United States‭, ‬targeting these cables could partially isolate the island and make coordination operations more difficult‭.‬

Why Are Submarine cables Still Weak Targets in Future Wars‭?‬

Western reports have revealed that more than 70%‭ ‬of undersea cable faults occur unintentionally‭, ‬whether due to anchors‭, ‬fishing‭ ‬nets‭, ‬weather factors‭, ‬shark bites‭, ‬or sunken ships‭, ‬which have recently become one of the threats to these cables‭. ‬

This makes it difficult to distinguish between accidents and attacks‭, ‬therefore increasing ambiguity and making it easier for attackers to evade responsibility‭.‬

Another weakness associated with submarine cables is the ease of locating these cables and pipelines‭, ‬as companies disclose their locations to reduce maritime accidents‭.‬

Thus‭, ‬the ambiguity dominating these environments makes underwater infrastructure attractive targets for hybrid wars‭. ‬This situation grows more dangerous given the ease of targeting this infrastructure and the ability of any country‭, ‬even a small one‭, ‬as well as non-state actors‭, ‬to pose a direct threat to it‭. ‬At the same time‭, ‬it is difficult to prove intentionality‭, ‬even if the perpetrator is known‭.‬

Monitoring submarine cables is not an easy task‭. ‬The length of these cables could extend around the world 30‭ ‬times if laid in a‭ ‬straight line‭, ‬and some of these cables lie at great depths‭, ‬reaching up to 8,000‭ ‬metres‭. ‬This poses a significant challenge for‭ ‬operations at these depths‭, ‬as demonstrated by the explosion of the experimental submarine‭ “‬Titan‭” ‬at a depth of 3,500‭ ‬metres in mid-2023‭. ‬In conclusion‭, ‬in light of the increasing threats to submarine cables and their transformation into a dimension of current underwater wars‭, ‬international governments can work on enhancing resilience to secure underwater infrastructure and deter‭ ‬any aggression in the grey zone‭.‬

This can be achieved by building more resilient systems for new projects from the start‭. ‬Additionally‭, ‬a short-term solution could be to enhance maritime awareness‭. ‬The likelihood of hostile entities targeting submarine cables could decrease if they realise they are being monitored‭, ‬which requires more sensors‭, ‬such as satellite imaging‭, ‬and sensors on ships and marine vehicles‭, ‬especially given the significant advances in artificial intelligence and quantum computing‭. ‬

Thus‭, ‬it is critical to enhance coordination between the public and private sectors to build resilient systems and increase maritime awareness‭. ‬●

By‭: ‬Adnan Mousa‭  (‬Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science‭, ‬Cairo University‭)‬

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